Hostages to Identification
by Richard Klein, LRCP&SI (MB, BS)
In the classical notion of belonging, for instance the social bond created by religion, the community is based on the logic of one-among-many. In 1921 in Group Psychology, Freud discovered the beginnings of a new social bond in the effects of the esprit de corps. This he based on envy of the younger sibling who knocked him off the breast. When the older sibling experiences being damaged by his own hate, a demand for equality emerges as well as a sense of duty. This sort of social bond is one step outside the monotheistic social bond but still with the same logic of one-among-many. What happened between then and the introduction of the knot by Lacan? From the esprit de corps to the esprit des noeuds (knot, ne pas, Verneinung). we have the signifier of the one-all-alone.
My interest is not in the notion of belonging to a community in the sense that social theorists like Durkheim, Weber and Mauss consider it. Their work centered on social cohesion and how it was produced in the community. I am interested in the heretic’s sinthomatic loss of community, which we also could call ex-communication. Freud, Joyce and Lacan were convinced that the social bond was a swindle. Once one aligns oneself with these three writers, the social bond becomes more interesting. The first time Freud took an interest in belonging to a community, he drew on Darwin’s hypothesis that men originally lived in small hordes and the jealousy of the oldest, strongest male prevented sexual promiscuity. The wandering younger males found partners outside the original horde. The social bond at that time was based on exogamy (Freud 1913, pp. 125-126). There was even a swindle in the so-called primal horde, namely the castration of the sons should they take any of the father’s women. This led to an uprising that resulted in the murder of the father. The effect of this murder was the establishment of both the totemic system and exogamy. Women are not exempt from belonging and the swindle implied. In The Taboo of Virginity (1918), Freud demonstrates this. He relentlessly exposes the social bond as a swindle in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921) and then in Civilization and Its Discontents (1930). In this theoretical trajectory, we pass through the narcissism of no differences, the narcissism of minor differences, and a break in narcissism via absolute difference where there is no identification at all. Heresy is the savoir faire of this trajectory. Of course, these days there are all sorts of heresies in addition to religious ones, including scientific heresies and literary heresies. Heresy in Lacan’s formulation always will involve the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father.
The guiding concepts of the paper are Lacan’s notions of absolute difference, heresy and the “desire of the analyst.” Let’s do definitions step by step. To say something very general about absolute difference, Roman Jakobson provides his readers with a useful reference. The 12th century theoretician of language, John of Salisbury, comes close to the logic of absolute difference. He said: “Naming and signifying are two different things [...] singularia are named, universalia are signified” (Jakobson 1990, p. 318). In psychoanalytic theory, the signifier is on the side of the universal. We see this, for instance, in the ideal signifier, which represents the ideals of the community. This suggests a demographic idea of what constitutes universality, which can be logically demonstrated. The particular is how the subject finds his satisfaction, which is on the side of drive. Lacan reveals this orientation in his final teaching: from universalia to singularia, from the universal to the particular. The universal is planted in the zone of signification. Naming fixes the reference at the level of singularia. This has a logic that John Stuart Mill called connotation and denotation, and Gottlieb Frege called sense and reference. Nomination in late Lacan is interpretation.
When a subject’s identifications crumble, the subject has become an object. The object may have a presence in the zone of the universal, but it does not belong there. That’s one of the first paradoxes the subject has to negotiate in reconstructing body, mind and soul. Absolute difference is an effect of this paradox; it is the difference between the signifier and the object of the drive. The object has a real status. We see this distinction most glaringly in psychosis. The status of the psychotic is that of an atypical citizen. Psychotics are very apt to suffer the imposition of absolute difference from outside while suffering it in their own psychical life as well. Jasmine, the protagonist in Woody Allen’s 2013 film, Blue Jasmine, was a woman who needed gentlemen of substance to keep body and soul together. Having lost her husband to another woman and turned him over to the police for his criminal activities, Jasmine managed to attract a diplomat and made him interested in her. She was with the diplomat when they encountered her brother-in-law in the street. An angry scene ensued, scaring the diplomat off. Cate Blanchett’s subtle performance in the role of Jasmine made the audience aware that Jasmine had been living on the edge for a long time. After this encounter, she started to wander in a fugue-like state, speaking, maybe mumbling, not signifying. She sits down on a public bench, where she has a right to sit, next to a woman already sitting there. Jasmine paid no attention to this woman. Her world had ended. She sat there mumbling. The woman, in a bit of a fright, vacated her place quickly. My hypothesis (not my diagnosis) is that her psychosis triggered following the aggressive encounter with her brother-in-law and the loss of the new man that she had ever so carefully set up. In that moment, the world had become enigmatic for her. Her identifications crumbled and her own structure was based on absolute difference. The dissolution of her identifications left her with mere existence. The irony she is suffering is that of a woman who wanted to be a cut above the typical citizen as well as the wife of a substantial man. She has become an atypical citizen but not in a good way. Atypicality can only be done in a good way, that is, heretically.
The analyst’s desire in the transference is the desire of the Other. This is what the analysand’s structure makes of the analyst’s desire. The analyst’s desire is not a borrowed desire. Above all, it is not borrowed from the Other. That makes it a de-Oedipalized desire. Lacan, who often proceeded by aphorism, remarked that the subject’s desire is the desire of the Other. It couldn’t be more Oedipal. The notion of the analyst’s desire seems to have emerged from a rather loathsome suspicion Lacan harbored toward identification with one’s analyst as an appropriate way to terminate one’s analysis. But, then, Lacan also recognized how easily this can happen. The problem is that, on the one hand, transference operates in a direction that takes demand back to identification, that is, to a defensive position. On the other hand, in the beginning, transference is essential to get the treatment off the ground and to keep it going. Lacan has to locate another operator that leads the subject to a different direction than that of identification. He’ll call it the desire of the analyst, which in Seminar XI, is the desire to obtain absolute difference (Lacan 1964, pp. 273, 274, 276). To arrive at absolute difference, one must cross the plane of identification, which is Lacan’s notion of the end of analysis at this time. He contrasts the desire associated with the moral law with the analyst’s desire. Moral law is desire in the pure state. This is, of course, Kant’s moral law, which cannot operate in the environment of an impure desire. Pure desire brings about the sacrifice of objects of love and of the sacrifice and murder of the pathological object (Lacan 1964, pp. 275-276). In other words, the desire attached to Kant’s moral law is a lethal desire. What does it mean to say that the analyst’s desire is impure? It means that the analyst’s desire concerns an ethics of the real. In my opinion, it is not an ethics of virtue and vice.
I am inclined to locate the ethics of virtue and vice in the community of egos on Freud’s graph from his Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (Appendix). It is being used as a measure of belonging to a community, although it is a better measure of belonging to, for example, an East London gang, which is, after all, a community. Insofar as we can measure the gang with the graph, its members have put the same object in the place of the ego ideal (aka the leader). Were you to take a little risk and interview the latter, he would insist that their morality was infused with virtues and vices. To topologize the community from the point of view of RSI (in French, these letters are pronounced heresy), in its foundations we will discover virtues and vices, which we can index on the symbolic and imaginary. This ego ideal is an ordering signifier, an identificatory signifier of omnipotence. The “omnipotent” is there to designate sponsorship by the Name-of-the-Father. It arranges things. This signifier brings order among the potential members by imaginary identifications, which are specular or narcissistic, that is, a narcissism of no differences. Freud calls this a primary group (1921, p. 116). He says it is the survival of Darwin’s primal horde (1921, p. 123). On the one side, we have narcissism of no differences, on the other, an ordering signifier.
Freud’s graph represents the structure of the cell of a social group before it becomes too organized (1921, p. 116). It contains three agencies: the egos, the ego ideal and, emphasized by Lacan, the object (a) found outside the community of egos on the right-hand side in a place marked x and labeled “external object.” The line of imaginary identification is the broken vertical line. This is the identificatory operator of the mirror stage. The object (a) becomes the object of all the egos, having been admitted to the community, internalized, put in the place of the ego ideal. The curves of the graph, according to Lacan, mark the conjunction of the object (a) with the ego ideal. Lacan says that the object is superimposed on the ego ideal (1973, p. 272). The object (a), which has a real status, is added to a signifier that is supposed to be symbolic, insofar as it is a signifier. The ideal signifier, thus, has omnipotent, identificatory functions: I + (a). I should also point out that the object (a) carries a charge of aggressivity. We can see the object embodied in the gaze of the hypnotist. Lacan says that the object in the place of the ego ideal is an object reduced to its stupidest reality (1960, p. 567). It is with such terms that Lacan occasionally treats the object. For example, Hitler’s moustache can function as object (a), giving satisfaction to subjects who idealize his moustache. The ego ideal can allow the idealization of aggressivity. Freud uses the relation to the hypnotist to demonstrate the subject’s relation to the ego ideal. The hypnotist is the ego ideal, he says. He is focusing on the symbolic value of the ego ideal to the detriment of this external object he has planted in his schema. There are many consequences stemming from the relation to the ego ideal. Freud provides us with two of them in the hypnotic relation: humble subjection and the sapping of the subject’s own initiative (1921, p. 114). In his graph, Freud isolates the behavior of the individual to the leader, which, at least according to him, justifies the hypothesis that the hypnotic relation is a group formation with two members in which sexual satisfaction is excluded. Such a formulation brings it much closer to the structure of a psychoanalytic session. We glean the logic that determines the end of an analysis, a devaluation of the ego ideal. It is a step in the direction of not belonging, i.e., not belonging to the group with two members. This is more to Lacan’s taste, and he says what has to happen. The analyst has to fall from his place in the ambience of the ego ideal, which leaves the object (a) to separate: I + (a) → + (a). Where would the analyst’s desire fit into this schema? Transference is not dominant when the analyst is no longer in the place of the ego ideal. The analyst’s desire brings demand back to drive, sweeping away ideals to cross the plane of identification. This is the trajectory towards absolute difference. What becomes of the subject who experiences his opaque relation to the drive? We don’t know, according to Lacan (1964, p. 273). Absolute difference involves a structural change at the termination of an analytic treatment, progressing from the narcissism of no differences to the narcissism of minor differences, and terminating in absolute difference, narcissism’s absence. Absolute difference is outside the field of ideals and, according to Freud’s graph, outside the field of belonging as well. It is intimately imbricated in the body, and to the ego as body-ego, while nevertheless remaining external to it. This shows the topology of extimacy. It will tell us a little more about structure on terminating an analytic treatment. The drive is going to be managed – not by the strong ego – but by a savoir faire with the sinthome.
In Freud’s fourth essay in Totem and Taboo, he quotes Frazer. The principal totem (which is the clan totem) represents the entire clan, and it passes in inheritance to the entire clan (Freud 1913, p. 103). In its religious aspect – identificatory omnipotence – the totem gives the subject protection, and the subject has a relation of respect to the totem. The totem functions as an ego ideal for the clan member. All the men and women of the clan put the same totem in the place of the ego ideal and Lacan calls this a signifier. This identification has hierarchical effects. Between the totem and the subject in bondage to it, there is a dissymmetry. This contrasts with the clan members among whom relations are symmetrical. This identification allows “relations of the clansmen to each other and to men of other clans” (p. 104).
The ego ideal introduces dissymmetrical relations among the egos, establishing a dialectic of symmetry/dissymmetry. This has effects of minor differences. Why would it be “narcissism” of minor differences and not just minor differences? The ego ideal is a symbolic agency representing rules. It is a paternal ideal and represents the rules of the Father. It reaches deeply into imaginary relations of the egos. In Schema R, the paternal ideal functions along the broken line of the left-hand side of the Schema up to the phallic signifier, which is the only signifier that Lacan thought had to be imaginary. The broken line represents the relation between I and ϕ as imaginary. The relation between P (père) and I is depicted as a solid line representing a symbolic function. The ideal is the pivot point between the imaginary and the symbolic. In Schema R, Lacan shows how a symbolic function rules over an imaginary one, and why Freud calls it narcissism of minor differences (Lacan 1957-1958, p. 462).
The question of the symbolic is key. What makes something symbolic is not necessarily its place in a religious hierarchy. The symbolic does not require the Father to support it. What counts at the level of the symbolic are differences, distinctions, differentials. We have to fall back on de Saussure: “...in language there are only differences. Even more important: a difference generally implies positive terms between which the difference is set up; but in language there are only differences without positive terms” (1915, p. 120). We have to consider the signifier separately. If we introduce the linguistic sign with its signifier and signified, we have a positive term: “But the statement that everything in language is negative is true only if the signified and the signifier are considered separately; when we consider the sign in its totality, we have something that is positive in its own class” (1915, p. 120). De Saussure maintains that an excessive homological effect makes the existence of language impossible. Lacan claims that the only definition he gave to the signifier is based on the principle of difference between signifiers: the signifier represents the subject to another signifier. Between “one” signifier and “another” signifier, there is a signifying difference.
Freud spots linguistic value in the nominalist theory of another anthropologist, Lang. Lang considers that the necessity for differentiation compels the clans to adopt names in order to differentiate themselves from one another. The proper name provides such a difference, but a positive one. Moreover, proper names are a function of the ego ideal. When you call your son “Max” because his Uncle Max died years ago, it is obviously an Ideal function. The Ideal function is necessary to belonging, and one requirement is a name. One waits for one Max to die before using the name again so as to maintain difference. This does not have a symmetrical effect (narcissism of no differences) but a dissymmetrical effect (narcissism of minor differences). The former effect has to be registered as imaginary and the latter as symbolic.
Four years after Totem and Taboo, Freud became enthralled with an anthropologist called Crawley. Crawley describes a taboo against oral jouissance among the Bakairi (Brazil) where every man eats by himself. In Bakairi tradition, when one eats in the presence of the other, it is the custom to do so with head averted, while the other turns his back and does not speak till the meal is over. When by accident one is seen eating, those who observe him as well as the one eating experience shame (Crawley 1902, p. 123). Crawley argues that each individual is separated from the others by a taboo of personal isolation (p. 124). The personal isolation lasts only as long as it takes to eat. Crawley translates the taboo of personal isolation as a taboo against physical contact. Avoidance of physical contact while eating is the taboo. It is the taboo of physical contact that leads secondarily to a certain avoidance behavior, which is then called personal isolation. Here the taboo of physical contact is at the level of the oral drive, the secondary effect of which is personal isolation. Here the oral object does not belong in the scene, just as the object in Freud’s graph is outside the scene, extimate to it.
Freud describes this “taboo of personal isolation” as the minor differences between people who are otherwise alike. Between the signifier (taboo) and the object (a) (food), the effect is feelings of strangeness and hostility between them (Freud 1918, p. 199). The specular, symmetrical relations among the Bakairi are disrupted by eating and replaced by affects of strangeness and hostility. It is Freud who calls it the narcissism of minor differences. A drive producing these differences interferes with narcissism. In Civilization and Its Discontents, the narcissism of minor differences does not have an effect of strangeness and hostility between people but of a harmless satisfaction of our aggressive impulse that aids social cohesion (Freud 1930, p. 114). In my opinion, there is a little more than just an inclination to aggression. It seems to me that Freud is emphasizing the signifier rather than the drive. Crawley, however, is using the notion of personal isolation to indicate the presence of the drive, and the drive is not on the side of social cohesion. Were we to translate what Crawley is describing among the Bakairi into Freud’s second topology, we would have the ego vs. id. Food is a drive object that obviously does not support social cohesion among the Bakairi. Food, however, is not necessarily a drive object in the Western world. Otherwise, there would be no dinner parties, often used to support social cohesion. Food becomes a drive object when it is too much or too little. For the Bakairi, food is a drive object that causes shame.
Crawley’s contribution is on the side of absolute difference, which is that difference between the ideal signifier and the drive object. Freud prefers to take Crawley’s contribution as an ideal notion, whereas Crawley is concerned with what we now call drive. The taboo of physical contact is introduced under the heading of the psychology of disgust connected to the nutritive and sexual functions. Food, he says, can be one of man’s fiercest desires, and the excreta from food produce the strongest loathing. Crawley calls it a primary nutritive impulse. It is not an ego ideal, but what we call the oral and anal drives. Disgust is correlative to satiety, that is, “too much,” and is the opposite of desire and satisfaction. The fear of causing desire and disgust in others results, according to Crawley, in personal isolation (Crawley 1902, pp. 121-122). One takes this personal isolation as an effect of the drive as well as a defense against it, averting one’s head, turning one’s back. In this case, it seems that the subject experiences himself as identified with the drive object; you are what you eat.
For Lacan, the Other is proximate to the other. The signifier of the ego ideal is extended to the purest moment of the specular relation. In other words, the symbolic is extended to the purest moment of the imaginary. What is the purest moment of the imaginary? It is the infant’s behavior at six months when placed in front of a mirror, which Lacan described in his 1949 paper. The baby gesticulates with great delight recognizing his image in the mirror and identifying with it jubilantly (Lacan 1949, pp. 75-76). The image of the little other or i(a) is made to sound like a species-specific trigger of identification. Not much at all happens to an infant propped up in front of the mirror. The child has to be persuaded that the image belongs to him. The scene in front of the mirror has changed. The child turns toward the person who is carrying him, appealing with a look to this witness who verifies the child’s image in the mirror, says Lacan (1960, p. 568). This way the image is libidinally invested by a signifier that passes into the image. The signifier structures, stabilizes, and guarantees the image. Such an image belongs to a little subject who will one day participate in the push to social cohesion via an ego ideal. Lacan gives the ego ideal a matheme: I(A). Of this Ideal one cannot always say where the symbolic ends and the imaginary begins.
Why towards the end of his career does Lacan use the example of Joyce as someone whose psychical structure is the best that can be expected from an analytic treatment at its end? Joyce never had a psychoanalysis of any kind, and, moreover, Lacan thinks his structure is psychotic. The secret must lie in the fact of his psychosis. What is the relation between the mad person and the termination of a psychoanalysis? Two quotes from Lacan are illuminating in this regard:
You will recall that a certain well-meaning “mass-in-hate” offered him a psychoanalysis, as one might a shower. And what’s more, with Jung...
From the play we are referring to he would have stood to have gained nothing, making straight thither for the best that can be expected from psychoanalysis at its end (1971, p. 11).
If Joyce is psychotic, one has to suppose that he is a psychotic with a strong subjective position. “It’s a fact that Joyce chooses to be, like me, a heretic” (Lacan 1975-1976, p. 15). The heretic is no longer reading from the point of the old ego ideal. He or she becomes a heretical reader of scripture, a wrong interpreter. Heretics lose their right to belong to the community. They are excommunicated. The heretic no longer puts one and the same object in the place of his ego ideal as his former fellow postulants do; rather, he restructures his ego ideal. Lacan offers us his heresy, one of them, in any case. It is a Joycean pun, he says, and it dephallicizes all men who claim to be descended from Adam and Eve: “Adam was a Madam” (Lacan 1975-1976, p. 13). Jacques Aubert can’t find the joke in Joyce’s writings in quite the form the pun is found in Seminar XXIII. He does, however, find in Ulysses the following: “Madam, I am Adam” (Lacan 1975-1976, p. 190). When Lacan read “Madam, I am Adam,” a palindrome, I suspect that he had already made his own pun out of it. That Adam has become a transsexual is, I think, a heresy that would leave Adam without descendants. A supreme and hilarious irony as well suggests that the Name-of-the-Father was not operating in the Garden of Eden. Between the heretic, Joyce, and his former compatriots exists an absolute difference. Before, he was one citizen among others, although he never was quite that. It is an assumption that the moment of Joyce’s heresy is the trigger of his psychosis. After Joyce’s heresy, he acquires a unique status as an atypical citizen. We return here to our earlier invocation of John of Salisbury’s linguistic theory: from universalia to singularia, or from one among the others to the one all alone. For the one all alone, is there nothing to belong to? Lacan shows how the personal isolation of a heretic, as le sinthome, can be a creation.
There are other reasons to turn to Joyce. Joyce has no desire to perfect the social world, an often tyrannical aim. He positions himself against the tyranny of the British Empire and of the Roman Empire as reabsorbed by Christianity. His Leopold Bloom stands against the racism inherent in the notion of Gaelic purity. It has to be Joyce that Lacan chooses because he extracts no enjoyment (jouissance) from common sense. For Joyce, no metaphor proceeds from “I am the way,” “I am the light.” These only lead to tyranny. Psychoanalysis cannot be political without this principle.
Joyce is the atypical citizen. Where Irish independence is in question, Joyce equates the British Empire with the Roman Empire insofar as it was absorbed by the Church. In making this equivalence, he absolutely does not belong to the Ireland of his time. He wonders whether it is worthwhile ridding Ireland of the yoke of the British Empire while it is still weighed down by that of the Roman. At the same time, from his exile, Joyce still clings to Dublin, interrogating his Irish visitors about precise geographical details, pestering them mercilessly for information about Ireland. He either cannot give up his sense of belonging or it is all done for his art, Ulysses. He writes to Nora Barnacle in 1904: “I cannot enter the social order except as a vagabond.” Joyce has put absolute difference between himself and his former fellow citizens. The heresy that Lacan imputes to Joyce is not far from our consideration of Freud himself. In a conversation with Reik, Freud spoke of himself as an outsider and of no longer belonging (Reik 1942, pp. 37, 119). Psychoanalysis has a tradition of non-belonging inscribed at its origins.
Margaret Drabble’s survey of English literature shows how the colonized appropriate the colonizer’s language. The colonized exercise their art in the colonizer’s language with subversive intent. This permits the appropriation of the colonizer’s language while maintaining absolute difference by way of sublimation. Joyce surely fits the bill for subversive use of the colonizer’s language. He makes use of stream of consciousness, as a flight of ideas, making the colonizer’s language a stream of enjoyment. He makes a litter the letter. This is a modern social bond, which has litter at its foundations. Joyce’s libidinal stream became his sinthome, and his sinthome was his art. Putting Drabble with Freud, Freud’s doctrine in its entirety becomes an attempt to subvert the colonizer’s language, for which he was awarded the Goethe Prize. Lacan turns to Joyce to consider structure at the end of an analysis insofar as it involves sublimation and construction. Could we say this is a post-colonial end to an analytic treatment?
 This comes from the logic of Gottlob Frege and J.S. Mill. Linguistic expressions bear a meaning. Denotation is the object to which the expression refers. For instance, the morning star and evening star have different meanings. The morning star is the bright object in the morning in the eastern sky. The evening star is found in the western sky in the evening. But both the morning star and the evening star denote the planet Venus. We could also say that meaning varies, and the object does not vary. The star in question will always have two meanings and one reference. To stop the wobbling in meaning is the same thing as fixing the reference. J.S. Mill uses what he calls singular terms to refer to proper names, specific objects and general objects.
 The enigmatic experience at the onset of a psychosis was noted by many French and German psychiatrists in the first third of the last century. Nevertheless, the loss of identifications is what creates absolute difference at the end of an analysis. Jasmine might not recommend it. But she does not have a strong subjective position.
 I think heresy involves separation from an old Ideal, that is, separation from the desire of the big Other, various constructions, sublimations which in Lacan’s views do not exclude the sexual and a rereading of the orthodox texts, the latter most important in the construction of the sinthome. Any subject who wishes to create a psychoanalytic heresy, we would wish that the latter had a fine grip on Freud’s texts. I don’t think they always do. Freud did, of course, create an establishment, or Jones did. However his texts have never created an establishment. There is instability in those texts. It will also be difficult to create a theory without a theory of the signifier and of a subjective topology.
 Of course, Freud knows something about this aggressivity in the same locus as the ego ideal. Otherwise he would not have sunk the ego ideal into another concept, the superego.
 Any body-event wherever it is experienced will dominate in the 1970s.
 I have myself not yet come across any psychoanalytic writer interested in the assertion that everything in language is negative and its effects on the Verneinung.
 Freud (1913), p. 112, where Freud cites the writer as Lang, 1905, pp. 125ff.
 Editor’s note: Klein is citing Lacan’s seminar on Joyce. The French “mécène” is homophonic in French with Messe=mass, and haine=hate. He is playing on the analyst’s hallowed position and clearly poking fun at its uselessness.
 The Oxford Companion to English Literature, edited by Margaret Drabble, Oxford University Press, 1998; see under post-colonial literature.
Crawley, E. (1902). The Mystic Rose, 4th ed.. Revised by T. Besterman. London: C. A. Watts & Co., Ltd., 1932.
de Saussure, F. (1915). Course in General Linguistics. Transl. W. Baskin. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966.
Freud, S. (1913). Totem and taboo. Standard Edition 13:1-161.
Freud, S. (1921). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. Standard Edition 18:65-143.
Freud, S. (1918). The taboo of virginity. Standard Edition 11:191-208.
Freud, S. (1930). Civilization and its discontents. Standard Edition 21:57-146.
Jakobson, R. (1990). On Language. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 318.
Lacan, J. (1949). The mirror stage as formative of the I function as revealed in psychoanalytic experience. Transl. B. Fink. In Écrits. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2006.
Lacan, J. (1957-1958). On a question prior to any possible treatment of psychosis. Transl. B. Fink. In Écrits. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2006.
Lacan, J. (1960). Remarks on Daniel Lagache’s presentation. Transl. B. Fink. In Écrits. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2006.
Lacan, J. (1964). The Seminar, Book XI:The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1977.
Lacan, J. (1971). Lituraterre. In Autres Écrits. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2001. Transl. B. Khiera-Foxton and A. Price. Hurly Burly: The International Lacanian Journal of Psychoanalysis 9:2013.
Lacan, J. (1975-1976). Le Séminaire, Livre XXIII: Le Sinthome. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2005.
Reik, T. (1942). From Thirty Years with Freud. London: Hogarth Press & the Institute of Psychoanalysis.
From: Freud, S. (1921). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. Standard Edition 18:65-143.
Address correspondence to:
Richard Klein, LRCP&SI (MB, BS)
17 Granville Road
London, N4 4EJ, United Kingdom
Richard Klein, LRCP&SI (MB, BS), is a practicing analyst living and working in London. Born in the U.S., he traveled widely in Europe before receiving his medical degree in Ireland. He received his training at the New Lacanian School of Psychoanalysis (NLS). Dr. Klein is member of the NLS and the World Association of Psychoanalysis. According to him, “he is an old man now with, one suspects, a few more years of bio.”